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CASE COMMENTS
the court merely split the settlement without considering that con-
tribution could be given without destroying the limitation placed by
the wrongful death act on Zontelli's liability. The principal case has
allowed the railway to recover more through contribution than the
administratrix could have recovered had she sued Zontelli directly.
JOHN R. Au'oRn
INSURER LIABLE FOR BENEFICIARY'S MURDER
OF LIFE INSURED
When Mrs. Earle Dennison became the first white woman to be
electrocuted by the State of Alabama, the factual background for an
unusual tort decision was complete. Mrs. Dennison was convicted
of the murder of her two and one-half year old niece, Shirley Weldon,
on whose life she had taken out three insurance policies, naming her-
self as beneficiary.' Shirley's father sued the insurance companies for
wrongful death, claiming they had been negligent in issuing policies
to a beneficiary who had no insurable interest in the life of the in-
sured child and that this negligent act was the proximate cause of
Shirley's death at the hands of the beneficiary aunt.2 The father ob-
tained a judgment for punitive damages in the amount of $75,000
which was upheld by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Liberty Nat'l
Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon.3
Actually, Mrs. Dennison was Shirley's aunt-in-law, for her de-
ceased husband was the brother of Shirley's mother. Living in a dif-
ferent town than the Weldons, she rarely saw Shirley and did not con-
tribute to her support. The evidence indicated that the insurance
agents made an inadequate investigation of this relationship for the
purpose of ascertaining the existence of an insurable interest.4
'Dennison v. State, 259 Ala. 424, 66 So. 2d 552 (953).
sAla. Code tit. 7, § 119 (1940).
Zioo So. 2d 696 (Ala. 1958).
'Mrs. Dennison took out policies on Shirley's life with three insurance com-
panies. Liberty National issued a $5oo policy on December 1, 1951. The agent knew
the relationship between Mrs. Dennison and Shirley, and company policy does not
make an aunt an acceptable beneficiary. Company policy also requires the consent
of the parents for a policy on a child under ten; neither parent knew of the policy.
Southern Life and Health issued a $5,ooo policy in March of 1952. Mrs. Dennison
submitted a false medical statement signed by a doctor in another town. The agent
told the parents that Mrs. Dennison was taking out an educational policy on Shirley,
but they did not consent or know that the policy had actually been issued. National
Life and Accident issued a $i,ooo policy in April of 1952. The plaintiff testified
that he told the agent not to issue any policy on Shirley's life.
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This factual situation presents two basic issues: First, were the in-
surers negligent in issuing life policies providing for the payment of
the proceeds to a beneficiary who had no insurable interest in the life
insured? Secondly, if the issuance of the policies was negligent, was
this act the proximate cause of the insured's death?
The defendant's negligence in the Liberty National case was neces-
sarily based on the premise that Mrs. Dennison did not have an in-
surable interest in Shirley's life. Blood relationship alone does not give
an aunt an insurable interest in the life of her niece.5 The evidence
in the case showed that the aunt had no insurable interest since she
had no reasonable expectation of receiving profit or advantage from
the continued life of Shirley.6 Insurance policies taken out by one
person on the life of another, without an insurable interest, are
illegal and void, as repugnant to public policy.7 This public policy
nullifies such a contract of life insurance because the holder of the
irisurance has a monetary interest in the death of the insured which
creates a temptation to crime.8
. The opinion in the Liberty National case fails to clarify the court's
purpose in discussing the danger to human'life which is present when
a life insurance policy is sold to a beneficiary who has no insurable in-
terest in the life of the insured. However, it would seem that the court
was trying to establish the scope of risk created by defendants' failure
to use reasonable care in issuing these life policies. Upon conclud-
ing that the defendants' acts were negligent, the court goes on to state
Comm6nwealth Life Ins. Co. v. George, 248 Ala. 649, 28 So. 2d 91o, 913 (1947);
Wilton v. New York Life Ins. Co., 34 Tex. Civ. App. 156, 78 S.W. 403 (1904).
6Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881); Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Volger,
89 Ind. 572 (1883); Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 8o111. 35 (1875); Rombach
v. Piedmont & Arlington Life Ins. Co., 35 La. Ann. 233 (1883); Vance, Insurance 154,
155 (2d ed. 195o).
'Warnock v. Davis, supra note 6, at 779; Brockway v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins.
Co., 9 Fed. 249, 254 (W.D. Pa. 1881); Helmetag's Adm'x v. Miller, 76 Ala. 83, 186
(1884).
8-Helmetag's Adm'x v. Miller, supra note 7, at 187; Hinton v. Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Ass'n, 135 N.C. 314, 47 SE. 474, 477 (194); Vance, Insurance 154 (2d ed.
1930).
A life insurance policy issued to a beneficiary who does not have an insurable
interest in the life of the insured is also called a wager policy. Connecticut Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Schaefer,94 US. 457, 460 (1876); Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. George,
28 So. 2d gio, 912 (Ala. z947). Such a wager on the life expectancy of a human
being is declared void because of the tendency to induce the violent death of the
subject of the wager. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881); Guardian Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Hogan, So Ill. 35, 45-(1875); Goddard v. Garrett, 2 Vera 269, 23 Eng.
Rep. 774 (Ch. 1692); Gilbert v. Sykes, 16 East 149, 159, 1o4 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1049
(K.B. 18ma).
9ioo So. 2d at 707.
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that these acts would not be actionable unless they breached duties
to the plaintiff and were also the proximate cause of the injury.10
According to the Restatement, conduct is negligent if it subjects an
interest of another to a certain hazard, and, in order to protect the
other from the risk of an invasion of his interest by the hazard, the
law creates a duty to refrain from the negligent conduct."
Insurance companies often require proof of insurable interest.
1 2
Such inquiry can hardly be called burdensome where human life
is involved.1 3 The statements of the beneficiary-purchaser alone ought
not to be sufficient, especially when the policy is to be issued on the
life of a child of two or three.' 4 It appears from the testimony recited
in the opinion of the principal case that the defendant insurers
relied on Mrs. Dennison's statements that she was interested in Shirley's
welfare. There was also evidence indicating that the defendants merely
informed Shirley's parents of Mrs. Dennison's intention to purchase
but did not obtain their consent to the issuance of the policies.15
Therefore, it seems that the defendants, by exercising more diligence,
should have known that Mrs. Dennison had no insurable interest in
Shirley's life, and thus were negligent. Where knowledge necessary for
=Ibid.
"Restatement (1948 Supp.), Torts § 281, comment e (1949).
"An aunt is not an acceptable beneficiary according to the Liberty National
Life Ins. Co. instruction book given to its agents. ioo So. 2d at 7o6. The writer's
personal inquiries and conversations with a certified life underwriter revealed
that policies such as were written on Shirley Weldon's life by the defendants are
not generally acceptable, and that a reputable firm would issue such a policy only as
a result of a gross oversight.
rhe greater the known or reasonably to be anticipated danger, the greater
the degree of care that must be exercised. Barret v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse
Co., 65 La. 1o75, 116 So. 563, 564 (1928); Shobert v. May, 40 Ore. 68, 66 Pac. 466
(1901); Van Dyke v. Grand Trunk Ry., 84 Vt. 212, 78 Ad. 958, 964 (1911); Spokane
Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 1o72 (1891). If human life is in-
volved, highest care is required. Bessemer Land & Improv. Co. v. Campbell, 121 Ala.
50, 25 So. 793, 798 (1899); Gayzer v. Taylor, 76 Mass. 274 (1857); Ashby v. Philadel-
phia Elec. Co., 328 Pa. 474, 195 Ad. 887, 889 (1938). Risk should be balanced
against the social value of the interest of the actor and disadvantages of pursuing
another course. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947); Williams v. East Bay Motor Coach Lines, 16 Cal. App. 2d 169, 6o P.ad 320
(1936); Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 91 N.W. 88o, 883 (19o2);
Prosser, Torts 122 (2d ed. 1955).
uA person known to be young and inexperienced is entitled to care propor-
tionate to his ability to protect himself, and the duty to avoid injury increases
with the inability of a child to protect himself. Lehman v. Hoover, ioo Fad 127
(6th Cir. 1938); Taylor v. Patterson's Adm'r, 272 Ky. 415, 114 S.W.9d 488, 490
(1938); Short v. Nehi Bottling Co., 145 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 194o);
Crosswhite v. Shelby Operating Corp., 182 Va. 713, 3o S.E.2d 673, 674 (1944).
"1oo So. 2d at 707.
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due care can be acquired by the exercise of reasonable diligence, vol-
untary ignorance is negligence.' 6
Even though the defendants were negligent, there would be no
liability unless that negligence were the proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's injury.17 The Alabama court follows the doctrine that "when
some agency has intervenetl and has been the immediate cause of the
injury. .. the party guilty of negligence in the first instance is not re-
sponsible, unless at the time of the original negligence the act of the
agency could have been reasonably foreseen."' 8 Although this is un-
doubtedly the prevailing view at the present time,19 some courts have
been reluctant to impose liability when the intervening act is crim-
inal.20 This reluctance is understandable, for at one time any inter-
vening cause relieved a negligent party of liability for harm resulting
from his act; the last human wrongdoer alone being held responsible.
2 1
The results under the last human wrongdoer rule were not desirable,
and the cases developed the principle that intervening negligent con-
duct did not relieve a defendant of liability if the intervening act
should have been foreseen. 22 In accordance with this concept, most
courts have gone further, holding that a foreseeable intervening crimi-
nal act will not sever the chain of causation, and, accordingly, will not
relieve the defendant of liability.23 Nevertheless, some cases have held
"3Mattson v. Cent. Elec. & Gas. Co., 174 F.2d 215, 220 (8th Cir. 1949); Go-
brecht v. Beckwith, 82 N.H. 415, 135 Atl. 20, 22 (1926). Risk involves recognized
danger, based on knowledge of existing facts and a reasonable belief that harm
may follow. Restatement, Torts § 289 (1934); Prosser, Torts 121, 131 (2d ed. 1955);
Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1928).
"Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276, 279 (D. Minn. 1947); Black v. Love & Amos
Coal Co., 3o Tenn. App. 377, 2o6 S.W.2d 432, 434 (1947); Comstock v. Wilson, 257
N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431, 432 (1931).
1ioo So. 2d at 709.
:0Prosser, Torts 266 (2d ed. 1955); Eldridge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding
Cause, 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 121, 125 (1937).
"he Lusitania, 251 Fed. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); Andrews v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390, 40
S.E. 3oo (191o); Milostan v. Chicago, 148 Ill. App. 540 (1901).
"Eldridge, supra note ig, at 124, citing Vicars v. Wilcock, 8 East I, 1o3 Eng. Rep.
244 (K.B. i8o6).
"Bole v. Pittsburgh Athletic Co., 205 Fed. 468 (3d Cir. 1913); Louisville & N.
R.R. v. Maddox, 236 Ala. 594, 183 So. 849 (1938); Rowell v. City of Wichita, 162
Kan. 294, 176 P.2d 590 (1947); Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136 (1872); Gil-
man v. Noyes, 57 N.H. 627, 630 (1876); Bennet v. Robertson, 107 Vt. 202, 177 Atd.
625, 628 (1935); Eldridge, supra note 19, at 124.
2"Nichols v. City of Phoenix, 68 Ariz. 124, 202 P.2d 201, 210 (1949); Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. Adams, x99 Ark. 254, 133 S.W.2d 867, 872 (1939); Neering v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943); Bellows v. Worcester Storage Co., 297
Mass. 188, 7 N.E.2d 588 (1937); Bfauer v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 91 N.J.L. 19o,
1o3 At. 166 (1918); Green v. Atlanta & C. Air Line Ry., 131 S.C. 124, 126 S.E. 441
(1925); Hines v. Garrett, 131 Va. 125, io8 S.E. 69o (1921); Whitehead v. Stringer, zo6
Wgash. 5o, i8o Pac. 486 (1919).
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that there is no reason to anticipate an intervening criminal act, and
thus such an act automatically breaks the chain of causation.24 These
cases amount to a refusal by the courts to extend the liability of a neg-
ligent party to include harm resulting from the intervention of the in-
tentional wrongful acts of a third person. This attempt to limit liabili-
ty has resulted in some rather harsh decisions where .negligent defend-
ants exposed plaintiffs to almost certain harm at the hands of a
third person and yet were relieved of liability because there was no
reason to anticipate a criminal act.25 For example, in the Georgia case
of Henderson v. Dade Coal Co.,26 the defendant had leased a con-
vict from the state and was charged with the custody of the prisoner
until his term had been served. Although the prisoner was known to
be vicious and immoral, the defendant negligently allowed him to
roam freely about. The convict raped the plaintiff who was denied
recovery because the defendant could not be expected to foresee any
crime at all.
The fact that some human beings do commit crimes, cannot be
ignored.27 Therefore, it seems erroneous to hold that a foreseeable
negligent act will not relieve a defendant from liability while all in-
tervening criminal acts will insulate the defendant on the premise that
no one can be expected to foresee a criminal act. Under the principle
applied in cases such as Henderson, it appears that a party can go quite
far in exposing someone to danger from another's malice although one
cannot expose his fellows to the likelihood that another's negligence
may cause harm. It is submitted that the better view is that, while
there is less reason to anticipate a criminal act than a negligent one,28
there are situations which create such temptations and opportunity
for crime that the reasonable man should recognize them and take
proper precautions. 29
I Andrews v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390, 40 S.E. oo (19o); Chancey v. Norfolk & W.
Ry., 174 N.C. 351, 93 S.E. 834 (1917); Phillips v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 15 S.W.2d
550, 552 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929).
'Andrews v. Kinsel, supra note 24.
Wioo Ga. 568, 28 S.E. 251 (1897).
2'Restatement, Torts § 302, comment j (1934).
'Crandall v. Consolidated Tel., Tel. & Elec. Co., 14 Ariz, 322, 127 Pac. 994, 997
(1912); Watson v. Kentucky & Ind. Bridge & R.R., 137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 146 (191o);
Prosser, Torts 141 (2d ed. 1955); Eldridge, supra note 19, at 125.
"Jensen v. United States War Shipping Administration, 88 F. Supp. 542 (ED.
Pa.), aff'd, 184 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. ig5o); De la Bere v. Pearson, [19o7] i K.B. 483; Re-
statement, Torts § 302, comment n (1934); Prosser, Torts 142 (2d ed. 1955); Eldridge,
supra note 19, at 125; Feezer, Intervening Crime and Liability for Negligence,
24 Minn. L. Rev. 635, 648 (1940).
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